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A DEFENSE OF PACIFISM
J. Kellenberger

In this article, after providing a preliminary characterization of pacifism, the author first
argues that pacifism sensibly articulates with the concepts of force and rights and then
critically discusses the just war position, the correctness of which would entail the wrongness of pacifism in a strong construction. The author goes on to argue that a primary
moral obligation of justice is sufficient to make it wrong to resort to war and that,
moreover, utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, and the religious ethics of love, on their
own separate grounds, arguably should agree on a repudiation of war, but, finally, religious
ethics repudiates war best because it sees best the heart of the matter.

Part of the issue of pacifism is a philosophical issue. This part of the issue relates
to the conceptual propriety and coherence of pacifism. Part of the issue of
pacifism is a moral issue. This part relates to our moral duty regarding war,
without a special appeal to religious duty. And part of the issue is a religious
issue. This part relates to our religious duty and to the implications of regarding
human beings in a religious light. In what follows, after providing a preliminary
characterization of pacifism as I understand it, I shall argue, against certain
philosophical critics of pacifism, that pacifism is quite coherent and sensibly
articulates with the concepts of force and rights. I shall then discuss the just war
position, the correctness of which would entail the wrongness, the moral wrongness, of pacifism in a strong construction. After this I shall go on to argue that
a primary moral obligation of justice is sufficient to make it wrong to resort to
war. And, moreover, as I shall then try to show, utilitarian ethics, deontological
ethics, and the religious ethics of love, on their own separate grounds, arguably
should agree on a repudiation of war. However, finally, I shall maintain, religious
ethics repudiates war best because it sees best the heart of the matter.

I
The term "pacifism" has been applied to many different views. Pacifism may
be understood as an opposition to war on grounds that range from moral to
economic to idiosyncratic and whimsical, or as a moral opposition to current
and threatening wars but not necessarily to all warfare, or as the moral repudiation
of all violence. Pacifism, as I treat it here, simply put, is a moral repudiation
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of all war. Given only the character of war, it repudiates war as presumptively
wrong, or, in its strong construction, as unqualifiedly wrong. Thus, as I understand the term, pacifism is a corollary of the moral repudiation of violence in
all human relations. It is distinguishable from the moral rejection of violence in
one's immediate relations with other persons, however, so that a pacifist can
morally reject violence at the state level and then, rightly or wrongly (wrongly,
I would argue), not reject it at the personal level. Pacifism, along with the
rejection of personal violence, may be regarded as the moral acceptance of
nonviolence. I In Christianity the acceptance of nonviolence has a long heritage,
going back to the first centuries of the Common Era. Origen, Justin Martyr, and
Lactantius, among others, regarded Christ's teachings to be at odds with war.
Today, while it is not in the mainstream of Christian acceptance, nevertheless
many Christian (rightly, as it seems to me) regard war as incompatible with the
message of the Gospels. However pacifism is not limited to Christianity. Nor
is pacifism limited to the religious.
There are several moral positions often imputed to pacifism that are not implied
by pacifism as I understand the view. For one thing pacifism does not entail
pas~ivity or the passive acceptance of moral evil. It allows the denunciation of
evil and the recognition of the duty to actively oppose injustice when it is
encountered. Similarly pacifism does not require an utter renunciation of force.
Pacifists without violating their pacifism may for instance forcibly interrupt an
assault: the rejection of violence does not require one to refrain from staying the
hand of a person who is beating another. Such forceful action remains nonviolent
in the relevant sense. Here we encounter a distinction that I take to be crucial
for pacifism: the distinction between morally allowable force and violence, which
is not morally allowable. About this distinction I shall have much to say later.
For the present, however, I shall observe only that some general distinction
between violence and allowable force is heeded in common practice and parlance,
where in certain contexts "violence" has a negative connotation, while "force"
does not. (Police violence, as opposed to forceful action by the police.) Admittedly the line between violent action and allowable forceful action is in practice
hard to draw at times, but at other times I think it is abundantly clear where it
lies. That there is such a distinction is, for Christian pacifists, shown by Jesus'
compatibly preaching peace in the Sermon on the Mount and driving the money
changers from the temple.
II

Pacifism has always had its critics. No state that regards itself as having the
right to declare war and to require its citizens to fight on its behalf can concede
the truth or rightness of pacifism. All those who believe that at least some of
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the wars engaged in by their respective countries were just wars properly undertaken must reject pacifism in its strong construction. Here, in this section, I want
to consider three distinct reasons for rejecting pacifism. Each, I shal1 try to show,
fails.
One reason that pacifism has been rejected is that it is held to be intemal1y
confused or incoherent. Jan Narveson in his "Pacifism: a Philosophical Analysis"2
develops and argues for this reason. Narveson construes pacifism as the view
that "it is morally wrong to use force to resist, punish, or prevent violence."3
But, he argues, "in saying that violence is wrong, one is at the same time saying
that people have a right to its prevention, by force if necessary. Whether and to
what extent it may be necessary is a question of fact, but, since it is a question
of fact only, the moral right to use force on some possible occasions is established. 4
And, he maintains, the amount of force justified by the right to the prevention
of violence is whatever is necessary to prevent an infringement of that right, as
with rights generally. I have two comments to make on Narveson's argument.
First, I think that he misconstrues both pacifism and nonviolence, or at least
construes them in a way that open them to objections by a conceptual rendering
more alive to their strengths. Pacifism and nonviolence, need not be so construed
that they utterly rule out one's use of force. It is true, though, that pacifism and
nonviolence cannot al10w force in every degree and form. This brings me to my
second comment on Narveson's argument. Narveson may be correct that if one
has a right to something, then it is implied that one may take steps to prevent
an infringement of that right. But surely, contrary to Narveson, we are not
morally justified in using whatever force is necessary to enforce our rights. If
someone steals some item I own-an ordinary pencil, say-he violates one of
my rights, but I am not therefore justified in stopping him by taking his life or
seriously harming him, even if this is the only way of stopping him open to me.
Thus, on the one hand the enforcement of our rights may allow force, but not
unlimited force; while on the other hand pacifism and nonviolence, properly
understood, though they do not allow unlimited force (which can amount to
violence), can and do allow the use of force.
A second criticism of pacifism may be put this way: pacifism destroys the
distinction between less objectionable and more objectionable acts in warfare,
and it must regard the most horrendous warfare as no worse than the least
objectionable. Richard Purtill seems to imply as much without quite saying it
when he observes that people in general, unlike pacifists, "always have and
perhaps always wilI make a distinction between Genghis Khan invading the
peaceful village to pillage and rape, and the villagers who spring to their own
defense."5 Purtill is of course right that there is a moral distinction here. However
pacifists need not deny the distinction. While pacifists see all war as wrong, it
does not follow that they must see al1 war or all engaging in warfare as equally
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evil. They need not and do not. They can recognize that a defensive war-action
is less heinous than an unprovoked attack. Similarly pacifists can recognize that
a barbarous war is more evil than a limited war in which both sides restrain
themselves. This is not to say that the limited war is not objectionable morally,
only that it is less objectionable. In the same way not all wrongs are equally
serious, but all wrongs are wrongs.
Thomas Nagel too suggests this criticism, although he stops short of actually
making it. He says, "if hostile, aggressive, or combative treatment of others
always violated the condition that they be treated as human beings, it would be
difficult to make further distinctions on that score within the class of hostile
actions" (the first emphasis is mine, the second his).6 Since what is difficult is
not impossible, he does allow that pacifists can consistently draw such distinctions, as indeed they can. Thus for pacifism, while all war is wrong, some forms
of hostility are worse than other forms. Nor is it especially difficult for the
pacifist to draw such distinctions. It is no more difficult for the pacifist than for
the nonpacifist, although for the nonpacifist some of the less hostile forms of
warfare may be counted as justified, while for the pacifist none will.
Nagel goes on to draw to our attention the distinction between "clean fighting"
and "dirty fighting," which, he points out, we apply to encounters ranging from
fist fights and political campaigns to philosophical argument. But, he says, "if
the concept is general enough to apply to all these matters, it should apply to
war-both to the conduct of individual soldiers and to the conduct of nations."7
Here, however, Nagel is making a stronger claim than earlier. This is especially
so given his analysis of fighting clean as directing one's hostility or aggression
"at its proper object" and fighting dirty as directing one's hostility or aggression
at an improper object so as to attack the proper object indirectly. An example
he gives in another context illustrates his distinction: in warfare firing a machine
gun at someone who is throwing hand grenades at one's emplacement would
qualify as clean fighting; machine-gunning his wife and children who are nearby
would not, even though it would effectively stop him. I think that all would
agree that a combatant's family is an improper object of hostility in warfare.
But, the pacifist would observe, it does not follow that the soldier is a proper
object. True, he is a conventional object, but, contrary to what Nagel implies
at one point," what is conventional in combative exchanges may still be morally
wrong. While the distinction between clean fighting and dirty fighting may well
apply broadly, it-unlike the distinction between wrong and worse---does not
apply to a number of confrontations involving human beings. For instance it
does not apply to rape, or to rapine. And it is rape, and more clearly rapine, as
the pacifist sees it, that are the analogues of war, not a political campaign. In
these confrontations there is no "proper object" for the kind of hostility or
aggression involved.
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Finally in this section let us consider G. E. M. Anscombe's double criticism
of pacifism. Pacifism is false, she argues, because it denies the right of rulers
to use violence, and it is perverse because of its effects.9 The reply to the first
part of her criticism is by now evident: while pacifism, or the moral repudiation
of violence of which it is a corollary, would reject the state's use of violence,
neither rejects as wrong the state's use of force, or "coercive power" (Anscombe' s
term), through its police agencies. to The second part of Anscombe's criticism is
that pacifism is pernicious because it leads to the killing of innocents. People
become corrupted by pacifism and begin to think that "a number of things are
wicked which are not." But they cannot refrain from war and so, seeing no way
to avoid evil, "they set no limits to it." Behind this criticism there may be the
idea that for pacifism all wars are equally evil, and this mistaken notion I have
spoken to already. However, whether or not this notion is part of the genesis of
Anscombe's criticism, I find the criticism itself to be rather curious. Analogously
one might argue that strict morality is perverse because it tempts people to give
it up as unattainable and so to indulge themselves. True, people might respond
this way to pacifism and its repudiation of war. Also, though, they might respond
by not supporting at least some wars. II
III

Beyond whatever criticisms of pacifism there are, there is an entire tradition
of moral reflection on war that stands opposed to pacifism in its strong construction, the just war tradition. In this tradition those wars that meet certain necessary
and sufficient conditions are deemed to be morally justified. Typically those in
this tradition regard many wars as unjust, but they allow that at least some wars
may be justified. This way of regarding war is as ancient as pacifism. The
tradition reaches back through Aquinas to Augustine, and from Augustine to
Cicero. Although the just war view is often regarded as a Catholic view, in fact
it is represented in Protestant thought as well. 12 Clearly, if the just war doctrine
were true, since some wars could be morally justified, pacifism in its strong
construction, which sees all wars as unqualifiedly wrong, would be false.
The criteria for a just war espoused within the tradition vary somewhat and
over time have become more stringent. Aquinas' three conditions-that the war
be declared by a sovereign, that it have a just cause, and that those who wage
it have just intentions I3-are now thought to be insufficient by those within the
just war tradition. For one thing, if "just cause" is broadly construed, these
conditions allow as just a war to redress a wrong or to retake territory, however
ancient and forgotten the wrong may be and however many times the territory
may have changed hands. For another, no limit is set upon the means of war
that may be employed. An expanded set of criteria offered by Joseph McKenna
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includes four other conditions: that the seriousness of the damage inflicted on
the, enemy be proportional to the injury suffered, that there be a reasonable hope
of winning the war, that war be turned to only as a last resort, and that the
means of war that are used themselves be moral. 14 And some in this tradition
explicitly limit the scope of a just war to self-defense or defense of another state
under attack, as does Richard Purtill. 15
It is worth observing, I think, that in its recent, demanding forms the just war
view may, in practice, agree with pacifism; for it may well be that henceforth
no war will meet these conditions. Nevertheless there remains a significant moral
difference between the two positions, which, from the pacifist's perspective,
arises from the just war theorist's failure to recognize the evil nature of war
itself. Moreover, there remain particular difficulties with the just war position
regarding its various conditions. To begin with, it may be, as Donald Wells
argues, that the conditions of McKenna's expanded set do not sensibly apply to
modem waf- 16 Wells argues that, given the broad-spectrum weaponry of modem
war-e.g., nuclear bombs and biochemical devices-it makes no sense to speak
of proportionality, right intention, or limitation. Another problem relates to
establishing the conditions named as the proper conditions. Purtill, who advances
a set of conditions very like McKenna's, argues that the conditions in his set
are in fact used by reasonable persons of good will to justify certain wars and
to reject as unjustified other wars. But Purtill is mistaken if he thinks that the
bare fact that reasonable people argue over whether a war meets the conditions
he names shows that some wars can be just. For, after all, those pacifists who
believe that no conditions are sufficient to justify war can consistently argue
with just war proponents that, on their own grounds, a particular war (say, the
Vietnam War) is not just. And even if it is true that often people argue the
justifiability of a particular war under the assumption that it or some war could
be justified in certain circumstances, this proves nothing; for at issue is the
conectness of the assumption, however conventional it may be,
Additionally there is to my mind a very great problem with the just war
doctrine relating to the place that it must give to sovereignty, However the set
of conditions for a just war is formulated, one condition is that the war be
declared by the sovereign, or, what comes to the same thing, the duly constituted
authority. This condition is one of Aquinas' three conditions and it is present in
the contemporary formulations of conditions for a just war offered by McKenna
and Purtill. The just war view, that is to say, must assume that there is a duly
constituted authority that can properly and by right declare war. But why should
we think that this is true? I am not calling into question the de facto ability of
states to arrogate to themselves the power to declare and initiate war. Nor am I
here calling into question the right of the state to pass laws relating to internal
regulation, which are of course legally, but also morally, binding on its citizens.
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If "sovereignty" means only this- the rightful power to govern its citizens-then

there is no objection. But "sovereignty" in the sense needed by the just war
doctrine includes the right not only to commit and distribute the resources of
those within the state, but to affect, indeed destroy, those outside the state. And
this is another matter. Certainly we need not concede that states have sovereignty
in the second sense if we concede that they have it in the first sense.
Many of course do believe that states have sovereignty in a supreme and
absolute sense that includes the right to declare war. However, as Paul Schilpp
points out, such a sovereignty is in contradiction with binding international law .17
Either the relations among nations are subject to international law or nations
have absolute sovereignty. But not both. To the extent that we believe there can
properly be binding international laws governing nations we must deny the
absolute sovereignty of states, and to the extent that we believe there can be a
properly binding international law against engaging in war we must deny the
right of any state to declare war. And of course if no state has the right to declare
war, then no war between states 1S can meet one of the necessary conditions for
a just war postulated by the just war theory.
However these are also positive reasons for holding that pacifism is morally
correct and that no nation or person ought to engage in war. One reason, which
I shall examine in the next section, is that war, by its nature, violates justice.
IV
If there were a paramount duty of justice that required us not to engage in
warfare, then even though a war might be fought for just ends, still this paramount
duty of justice would be overriding. Arguably this is just the case.
Sometimes the rights of individuals come into conflict and then it must be
decided which right takes moral precedence, that is, which of them justice
requires us to respect in our actions. In such cases we should respect the more
basic, if one of the conflicting rights is more basic than the other. That is, in
cases where one right derives from another we should respect the more fundamental, underlying right. It is not always clear when this is so. In fact, I will allow,
it is rarely clear. When it is clear, though, the more basic right takes moral
precedence. Now one right in particular can make a fair claim to be the most
basic right, namely the right of persons to be treated as persons. This right, it
seems, is the underlying right of human beings, upon which the others rest.
Engaging in war, though, is at odds with respecting this basic right of persons.
It is so because, while all that this right entails may not be clear, it is clear that
it entails not dismissing the humanity or worth of others. It entails not viewing
and treating human beings merely as obstacles in our path to be got around or
climbed over. War, unlike staying the hand of an assailant, involves viewing
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and treating the enemy with hostility and, often, even as being dehumanized.
But these ways of viewing and treating other human beings render them as
objects, as mere obstacles, and so these ways of viewing and treating others are
in themselves a violation of the right of human beings to be treated as persons.
This is so whether or not the war is fought according to rules and efforts are
made to keep it "gentlemanly." Though certain rules are followed and civilities
exchanged, even before the fighting begins, but especially after it has begun,
the tendency of those engaged is to view the enemy with hostility. Or worse,
after the civilities, the enemy may be treated, not with hostility, but as so many
dehumanized targets. For combatants this tendency is deepened by the use of
weapons that do not require face-to-face contact. For the opposed civilian populations the process is encouraged by each side's propaganda effort. Perhaps the
violation of the right of human beings to be treated as persons is clearest when
the enemy is dehumanized and treated as material objects to be obliterated or
neutralized. But treating the enemy with utter hostility also violates this right.
Some, however, it must be admitted, would challenge this last claim. For,
they would argue, to treat persons with hate is still to treat them as persons. In
a sense this is true. Hate of another is a personal attitude, as opposed toone's
attitude toward the chilliness of the day or the grayness of the sky. And being
someone's enemy can be an intensely personal relationship in that the relationship
can feed on knowledge about the other's personality or the history of his actions.
However, acting with hate toward another person does not entail respecting any
of that person's rights, let along his or her basic right to be treated as a person.
If anything, it is in tension with respecting his or her rights. A related point is
that hostility can be personally directed and, as Nagel argues, in warfare we
would in a sense treat individuals as persons if we would intentionally direct
our hostility toward them as subjects with the intention that they receive it as
subjects (as opposed to a dehumanized "bureaucratic operation," as he puts it).19
But, again, to direct hostility toward individuals as subjects is not therefore to
treat them as persons in the way required by their fundamental right to be treated
as persons. True, it is to treat them as knowing, conscious beings, as opposed
to material objects or dehumanized targets. But still it is to treat them as mere
obstacles in one's path----<:onscious, knowing obstacles, though they are regarded
to be-whose removal or neutralization is a means to one's end. It is possible
to view persons with contempt, even a kind of hate, and to respect their rights,
even their basic right to be treated as persons, let us allow, as when rights are
grudgingly respected. But to view and treat others with utter hostility-to allow
hostility to be the crystallizing focus of one's regard for others-is to regard
them as mere obstacles or objects who by virtue of being mere obstacles have
forfeited their basic right to be treated as persons.
Thus, since war requires treating the enemy as dehumanized or at least with
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this kind of overriding hostility, even though a particular war may be fought for
just ends (to oppose atrocities, say) of necessity it will violate the underlying
right of those designated "the enemy" to be treated as persons. And since war
requires us to violate this most basic right of persons it requires us to violate
the paramount duty of justice, and so our engaging in war is incompatible with
our practice of justice.
If we allow that treating persons in accord with their right to be treated as
persons is a primary good, then we can put what we have just seen, or what in
practice would be close to it, in utilitarian terms: even if in some instance a war
were to maximize other goods, no war can maximize the primary good of treating
persons as persons. And this will hold true even for a war against a nation that
is oppressing individuals, provided only that the number of those oppressed is
less than all those in the nation plus those on the other side, that is, all those
who would be designated "the enemy" by one side or the other. If we are not
constrained by utilitarian thinking, then we can say that even if, after considering
all the goods we were to conclude that some war would maximize goods, it
would remain that that war is a truly evil means to a good end; and truly evil
means are not justified by good ends. Again, even if there were a prima facie
duty to engage in certain "just wars," given that war finally always violates
justice, it would be overridden. In fact, though, it seems to me that the inevitable
opposition between war and the right of human beings to be treated as persons
defeats the claim that there is such a prima facie duty in the first place. Rather
there is at times a prima facie duty to use force. However war requires, not
force, but violence.
Earlier I said that the line between allowable force and violence may in practice
sometimes be hard to draw. Conceptually is the line any clearer? Several ways
of understanding the distinction press forward for consideration. One way is to
understand violence as wrongful force. Such a construction, while it has the
appeal of simplicity, surely counts too much as violence. It would, for instance,
count a negligent use of force as violence, and while a negligent use of force is
morally deficient the moral deficiency of violence is of a different magnitude.
It is not sufficient for the occurrence of police violence that officers, though
they ought to have known better, miscalculate the degree of force required to
subdue a lawbreaker. Such an instance stands in contrast to the police beating
lawbreakers after they are subdued, which clearly is an instance of police violence.
Again, violence might be understood as force that violates the rights of individuals. But once more this way of understanding violence construes the category
far too broadly. When someone enters my house and steals from me an item of
property that he has reason to believe I will never miss he violates one of my
rights, but he has not thus far treated me with violence. Both of these ways of
understanding the difference between allowable force and violence have the
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virtue of not construing the difference as one of mere degree, so that lesser force
is morally allowable and greater force is violen.::e. Both, however, leave out of
consideration the intentional element of action.
When we use allowable force, I suggest, we continue to have the intention to
respect the underlying right of persons to be treated as persons, which is to say
that we continue to regard their good; when we resort to violence we do not.
When the police through negligent miscalculation use more force than is necessary
to subdue a lawbreaker they still may have the intention to respect his right to
be treated as a person; and a housebreaker, though he is stealing my property,
may not yet have abandoned all thought of my good. This way of understanding
the distinction also explains why, say, one person's slapping another mayor
may not be an act of moral violence. It explains why what ostensibly is an
innocent remark, if it is designed to make someone suffer, can be a violent act.
And it explains why forcibly stopping one person's assault on another may not
be a violent act. In stopping an assault not only is the victim aided but the
perpetrator is stopped from doing that which he ought not to do, which hurts
him and alienates him from his fellow human beings. In Plato and in Proverbs
we find the idea that evil harms the evil doer. If so, consideration of the good
of a person can be sufficient to require us to prevent him from doing evil.
Are there as well cases where taking someone's life is not a violent act? Yes,
I think so. In certain cases of euthanasia neither force nor violence may be used,
as when a person who is terminally ill, in accord with his or her wishes, is not
put on a life-support system or is taken off one. Some may wish to go further.
Some may say that there are cases where it is a morally nonviolent act forcefully
to take the life of another against his or her will, as when someone is threatening
the life of an innocent victim, and there is no other way to save the victim's
life. This is a difficult case, however, and I can imagine intuitions being divided
on it. In such a case the choice is between not acting and so allowing the aggressor
to take an innocent life, and taking action that saves the innocent life but only
by taking a person's life against that person's will. The important question here,
as far as violence is concerned, as I see it, is this: What course of action considers
the good of each person equally? And I can imagine different individuals giving
different answers to this question.
Let us allow that at times forcefully taking the life of another in such circumstances is not a violent act. How does this affect my claim that war involves,
not force, but violence? It leaves the claim intact, I believe. It does because it
remains that in war the enemy are viewed with hostility or even as dehumanized,
which is not to consider their good. Even though in war it may be possible, in
principle, to respect some of the rights of the enemy---e.g., their right not to be
tortured or gassed-it remains that war by its nature requires each side to treat
the other with at least hostility, which is at once not to act out of consideration
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for their good and to violate their right to be treated as persons.
There is, then, a close moral and conceptual connection between respecting
the basic right of persons to be treated as persons and not treating persons with
violence. When we do not consider the good of those affected by our actions
we fail to respect their right to be treated as persons and thereby we treat them
with violence. However, as Michael Walzer observes, we can surrender our
rights if we choose. He argues that while no one can morally be forced to fight
or to risk his life, an act of war is legitimate if those who go to war and those
who are warred against have by their own act surrendered their rights. 20 But, we
might ask, can one surrender one's basic right to be treated as a person? The
answer is that one cannot, even though one can surrender other, less basic rights.
While I can give up my right of ownership regarding some item of property and
so my status as owner of that item, and while I can by surrendering to internment
give up my right to liberty for some period of time and so my status as a free
individual for that period of time, I cannot give up my right to be treated as a
person since that would be tantamount to giving up my status as a person. The
right to be treated as a person is, for persons, truly inalienable. Accordingly the
requirement of justice that this basic right of persons be respected is unalterably
at odds with engaging in war.
But some have detected what they regard as a darkling confusion of obligations
within morality itself as it relates to war, which, counter to what I have been
maintaining about the requirements of justice, would make both engaging in war
and not engaging in war wrong. Nagel, reflecting on war, has suggested that
there is an irresolvable moral dilemma between following absolute prohibitions
and respecting the obligation to prevent eviJ.21 In a wartime situation we may
be presented with a dilemma between following the absolute prohibition against
murder and preventing a stronger nation from enslaving a weaker nation. In such
a case, Nagel suggests, it may be that we cannot escape doing what is wrong.
Neither course may be right, even though one must be chosen. The dilemma is
acute because it may be, Nagel says, that we find ourselves in such a dilemma
through no action of our own-as opposed to the familiar case in which one,
through one's own actions, gets into a situation where whatever one does one
acts wrongly, as when one makes incompatible promises. In such familiar cases
we could have avoided the dilemma, and so the principle that ought implies can
is preserved. But in a wartime situation, since events beyond our control may
present us with a choice between two evil actions, the principle is overthrown.
Now if Nagel were right, then pacifism as well as the appeal to any basic and
overriding right of persons to be treated as persons would be in error. In at least
some cases, it could tum out that if we followed the prohibition against war we
would be doing what is wrong, just as in violating the principle we would be
doing what is wrong although perhaps in neither cases would we be blameworthy.
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But I think that Nagel is open to emendation on two counts. First, he has
underestimated the role of moral complicity and the failure to act. Contrary to
what Nagel suggests, it may be that if we find ourselves faced with the wartime
dilemma Nagel cites, we do so because we through our contributory actions, or
through our failure to take action, have helped to bring it about. I believe that
a strong case can be made for this being so, especially in countries where citizen
protest can influence foreign policy. If this is correct, then what Nagel sees as
the wartime moral dilemma is one that we have helped to bring about by our
own actions or non-action, and so it is more like the familiar kind of moral
dilemma for which we are responsible. However, more importantly, Nagel may
be wrong, I believe, in seeing the wartime moral situation as an instance of his
kind of moral dilemma in the first place. Nagel has, rightly, identified a situation
where whichever course of action we pursue we will cause and feel pain and
can proceed only with fear and trembling; and then he has, wrongly, concluded
that in such situations both courses of action may be wrong. This does not follow.
(It would not follow even if in such a situation inevitably we were to feel guilty.)
Very often when we make a moral choice we make someone unhappy, and often
we will bring down upon ourselves condemnation and even wrath. This, though,
does not mean that it may be that any course we choose is wrong. It is closer
to the truth to say that whatever we might do there will be cause for regret, and
that what we ought to do is something that we wish we were not called upon to
do. I think that very often in wartime we are faced with just this kind of moral
situation. But we need not conclude that in wartime it may be there is no morally
right course. Rather we, the pacifist and the nonpacifist, are faced with a hard
moral choice. And, if I am right, the grounds, or at least one set of adequate
grounds, on which pacifists can base their repudiation of war is a consideration
of justice and the basic right of persons to be treated as persons.

V
However, the moral rejection of war need not rest directly on an appeal to
justice. Utilitarian, deontological, and religious ethics must or arguably should
condemn war on their own grounds.
Consider utilitarianism. Utilitarians, I think, would agree that war is wrong
on their view if treating persons as persons is counted as the primary good. But
even if we limit utilitarianism to the traditional goods, or even to only happiness,
it can be argued that utilitarianism should condemn war. Nagel presents the
relevant considerations in his "War and Massacre."22 In the first place, he points
out, utilitarianism justifies some limitations on the means of war. In addition,
utilitarian considerations militate against a nation's use of devastating weapons
even though such use may give a nation a temporary advantage or even lead to
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victory; for, given utilitarianism, long-term effects beyond the war's termination,
on all those affected, are to be considered. Also it is arguable that, given
utilitarianism, war itself should be repudiated; for it is arguable that in every
instance the effects of refraining from military action, even if they include
allowing atrocities to be committed, will be less bad than the results of resorting
to war. It is not surprising that Jeremy Bentham did in fact reject war and in a
short work developed a plan for international peace. 23 Indeed, as Nagel points
out, using a rule-utilitarian rationale we can reason that, even if in a specific
instance the results of resorting to war were less bad than the results of not doing
so, still consistently following a pacifist policy would in the long run produce
the least bad results.
Kant's deontological ethics too can be marshalled in defense of pacifism.
True, Kant in The Metaphysic of Morals maintained that "free states in the state
of nature," as he called them, have a right to wage war, provided they have the
consent of their citizens.24 However, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals, where Kant develops his foundational thinking about morality and its
basic principles, the case is different, it can be argued. The categorical imperative
notoriously is hard to apply, but a fairly clear case can be made that it would
be, in Kant's language, "contradictory" (that is, self-defeating), to make nuclear
warfare universally permissible. And the same can be said of any prolonged or
greatly devastating war. 25 Also it seems that in Kant's full conception of the
moral law it implies a positive and general obligation to maintain peace, even
though Kant himself did not argue this. A second expression of the moral law
is the principle of ends, or the practical imperative, which says: treat others,
and yourself, never merely as means, but also as an end. And war-all war-it
is arguable, brings us to the point where we treat the enemy merely as means
and not as ends.
Finally I would consider religious ethics, that is, the ethics of love that is
found in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The ethics of love may not strictly be a
theory of obligation; yet it does generate obligations in that acting in accordance
with love, and out oflove, carries implications for internal and external behavior. 26
The ethics of love is closely associated with Christianity, but it is not only
Christians who may practice an ethics of love. For Christians, of course, and
for some who are not Christians, the guidelines of love are contained in the
scriptural accounts of the life and sayings of Jesus. To many it seems quite clear
that the life and teachings of Jesus are not compatible with the approval of war.
He who gave the Sermon on the Mount and spoke the Beatitudes, in rejecting
all violence of thought and action, rejected the mass violence of war. Even if
war is not explicitly rejected in the Gospels, it is at odds with love of neighbor,
which is the second great commandment. As Coleridge wrote, "War is not
forbidden by the Gospel, but only the Passions whence alone come Wars among
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men."27
Earlier I noted that in the first centuries of Christianity Jesus' teachings were
regarded as at odds with engaging in war. There are, however, other constructions
of the requirements of Christian love. There is within Christian moral reflection
the just war tradition, as we have seen. Anscombe, whose thought on war is
within this tradition, would say that I have presented a false image of Christianity.28 It is true that I am inclined to give to the Sermon on the Mount and Christ's
words to Simon Peter when he drew his sword the sort of central importance
that she thinks is misguided. She believes that other passages in the New Testament support a nonpacifist reading of the Christian message. She mentions two.
One is the passage that contains Christ's commendation of the centurion (Matthew
8.5-.10). But it seems to me that Anscombe's interpretation of the passage is
forced. Contrary to what she implies, it is not the centurion's military vocation
that is commended; it is precisely his faith that Christ has healed his servant.
The other passage she mentions is the one in which St. John the Baptist tells
soldiers what they ought to do. He says: "Do violence to no man; neither
calumniate any man; and be content with your pay." (Douai-Reims, Luke 3.14)29
This is the same passage cited by Augustine in Letter 138, where he reasons
that if the Christian religion condemned all war St. John would have counseled
soldiers to cast away their arms and quit the military. 30 It seems to me noteworthy
that St. John does say that soldiers should "do violence to no man." Does he
mean only civilians and have in mind extortion directed against civilians? Perhaps,
for this may have been a prevalent evil. But if this is his meaning, still we should
not conclude that war is condoned, it seems to me, for obviously St. John's list
of items is incomplete: covetousness and adultery are not condoned by their
omission. And when we look at other passages in the Gospels, such as John
15.12 and Luke 6.27-.29, we find that nonviolence in thought and action is
required of those who would follow Christ's teaching.
There is another problem with Anscombe's construction of religious ethics.
Ans(;ombe, in accord with the Augustinian tradition that she seems to be following, asserts that intentions are all important for the morality of actions. Still,
she is rightly suspicious of the idea that interior-act intentions determine rightness,
a view she associates with Cartesian psychology. On this view, Anscombe
observes, in order to act morally one needs only to " 'direct [one's] attention'
in a suitable way," which in practice means no more than saying to oneself
"what I mean to do is .... "31 And then something innocuous-sounding, like
"trying to defend freedom," is named while one proceeds to do mayhem. For
Augustine too it is intention, or inward disposition, and not outward action that
determines th~ rightness of action. Thus, for Augustine, while Christians have
a duty to fight in defense of the state when the ruler requires them to, in doing
so they are to maintain benevolence in their inmost hearts. If they do they violate
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no Christian precept. 32 What Augustine, unlike Anscombe, fails to see is that
one's intention or disposition is not something that exists in absolute isolation
from one's outward actions. And it seems to me that both Augustine and
Anscombe fail to see that certain actions have at least a prima facie incompatibility
with right intention or benevolence: realistically, there is no benevolent imposition
of starvation conditions, and no torture is benevolently bestowed. It is such a
view as that apparently shared by Augustine and Anscombe that Erasmus must
have had in mind in the Praise of Folly when he ridiculed the idea that love of
neighbor is compatible with plunging a sword into him.33 Nagel in a similar
quasi-Augustinian vein calls up the image of "a morally pure conscript who [is]
driving a tank towards us with the profoundest regrets and nothing but love in
his heart."34 Driving a tank down on people, even if they are combatants, may
be done with regret but not "with nothing but love in [one's] heart." One might
as well allow that an SS officer who condoned torture loved his victims if he
worked up enough warm emotion. Two points should be noted here. First,
intention, or inward disposition, is important for morality, and especially for
religious morality. But, second, it must be allowed that intentions are expressed
in our actions and so related to action that certain actions conceptually are at
odds with certain intentions. Both of these points are heeded by religious
pacifism-this second point being important for understanding the distinction
between force and violence (a distinction that seems to me to be crucial for
pacifism, religious or not) because, if my analysis in Sec. IV above is correct,
that distinction is essentially intentional.
What emerges, then, is that a coherent view of a religious ethics of love, and
of Christian ethics in particular, is pacifistic. However, as I have tried to show,
utilitarian and deontological theories of obligation also repudiate war, or arguably
should. Are all three on a par then? No, I think not. It seems to me that religious
ethics is basic to the other two, for it sees deeper into the essential reason why
war is to be repudiated. I shall try to bring out how it does in the next and
concluding section.
VI
One way to see how religious ethics is more penetrating than utilitarianism is
to reflect on how the two consider one nation's threatening another. It seems to
me to be a clear principle of morality that if one recognizes the evil of a certain
action, then one ought not to threaten to employ that action. State authorities or
individuals may threaten to use certain kinds of force consistently with this
principle precisely because they regard that force as morally allowable. But if
what is threatened is evil and seen to be evil, then the threat itself is evil. Thus,
so far as this principle is concerned, it is morally tolerable for the state to threaten
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potential lawbreakers with incarceration, but it is not tolerable for the state to
threaten to torture their relatives. Now, as we have seen, it is arguable that
utilitarianism and religious ethics agree that war is wrong. But it does not follow
from this that they agree that threatening war is wrong. And, in fact, for
utilitarianism, if the results are good enough, threatening war is justified and
even a duty. Neither for an ethics of love nor for Kant's ethics is this so.
Douglas Lackey, who discusses the morality of threatening evil, helps us to
identify two distinct reasons why threatening evil is wrong. 35 His concern ultimately is with nuclear deterrence policy, but the case he uses for illustration is
the case of a man's defaulting on a debt. In such a case, Lackey observes, one's
threatening the man with death in order to get him to pay the debt, even though
one has no intention to kill him, is not morally justified by the good results that
follow. Lackey gives two possible causes of the wrongness of threatening evil
in this case. First, it may be that the inherent evil of the threat makes it wrong.
Second, it may be wrong because of the "bad results that would ensue if everyone
regularly made threats of this sort." The first cause or reason is important for
religious ethics, for the inherent nature of threatening evil puts it at odds with
acting out of love for the person threatened and so makes it itself a form of evil.
The second is important for Kant's ethics-if we change the "bad results" language to language about the self-defeating nature of such an action if everyone
were to do it regularly. Despite Lackey's slight reluctance unequivocally to apply
his reasoning to threatening war (where the stakes are higher), we should note
that either cause justifies and requires a moral renunciation of threatening war,
as well as of war itself. It is a strength of religious ethics and of Kant's ethics
over utilitarianism that they are clear on the wrongness of threatening war.
A similar strength comes out if we consider certain conceivable wars that are
rigorously confined to strict limitations. Historically wars have not been limited
in scope. In warfare generally the weapons of war engulf civilians, and, in
modem war, are sometimes aimed at civilians, so that the death of noncombatants
is not an unfortunate and inescapable side-effect of conflict, but a deliberate and
intentional way of gaining victory. Because wars historically have had this
character I was able to argue earlier that utilitarianism should reject every war.
Let us allow, though, that there may be possible wars between small disciplined
mercenary armies engaged in a limited way, in which noncombatants are not in
danger. Such a war, unlike modem total war, would be analogous to gladiatorial
contests, which, though to the death, do not threaten the lives of noncombatants.
I doubt that there have been such wars, or that today there could be such a war.
But that is beside the present point. Given such a war, if the benefits outweighed
the harm, utilitarian ethics-4Jr at least act-utilitarian ethics-seems committed
to sanctioning the war. For religious ethics, even such a war as that imagined
is at odds with the internal and external requirements of love, as they relate both
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to the gladiatorial soldiers and to those who would put them into the field.
Religious ethics sees clearly the violation of the worth of persons in even such
a limited war situation. We should note, however, that here too, as in the cases
of threatening war, Kant's ethics has a similar strength. Why religious ethics is
more penetrating than deontological ethics we have yet to see.
Both religious ethics and Kant's deontological ethics give a place to the worth
or dignity of persons as persons. However Kant's ethical thought is often understood as grounding ethics in respect for the moral law, as opposed to moral
respect for persons. Where Kant rejects the moral worth of the inclination to do
good and insists upon the priority of a sense of duty he suggests this (as in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals). I do not think that Kant meant that
actions done from inclination or sympathy for another person were necessarily
lacking in moral worth, only that they would be if a sense of duty were not
sufficient to move one in the absense of inclination or sympathy. In his Lectures
on Ethics Kant says that "a man may act kindly towards his wife from love, but
if his inclination has evaporated he ought to do so from obligation. "1" Also we
should bear in mind that for Kant both the categorical imperative and the practical
imperative, or ends principle, are expressions of the moral law. And the ends
principle requires us to treat persons as ends and never merely as means. Moreover
it is possible to understand Kant as saying that in "the kingdom of ends" "every
human being is worth doing things for, just because and only because he is
human."37
Yet the ends principle itself, like the categorical imperative, can be followed
solely out of respect for the moral law, as opposed to respect for persons as
persons. One can regard it as a moral duty to treat persons as persons and never
merely as means and unfalteringly do so out of respect for the moral law without
respect for any person as a person. Kant's ethics seems to allow one-some
would say encourages one-to hold dear the ends principle as a principle and
to act for its sake, judiciously respecting the rights of persons while maintaining
a mild antipathy toward individuals as persons. For this reason-because Kant's
ethics is open to such an understanding-religious ethics more clearly sees the
underlying personhood of human beings. St. Paul said that if he delivers up his
body to be burned but without love he gains nothing (1 Corinthians 13.3). In
the religious ethics of love one great commandment is to love others, and if we
but respect the right of persons to be treated as persons without the inward
disposition of love, we fail to keep that commandment. In this way, within an
ethics of love, what is required is not merely respecting the rights of persons,
but instead the basic perception and appreciation of the worth of persons as
persons, reflected in the response of love, that underlies the right of persons to
be treated as persons, reflected in the response of love, that underlies the right
of persons to be treated as persons. It is in this sense that a religious ethics of
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love sees deeper into the moral basis for a repudiation of war.
It is worth noting, I think, that while religious ethics sees best the underlying
reason for the moral rejection of war, a spark of the informing perception of the
wOlth of persons is found not only in Kant's ethics but in utilitarian ethics as
well. The perception is evident, of course, even if not primary, in Kant's ethics.
But it is also detectable in John Stuart Mill's utilitarian ethics. Mill insisted that
each person has a claim or right to happiness and that each person's claim is
equal. True, Mill reduced this to the purely utilitarian principle that equal amounts
of happiness are equally desirable. However, without this reduction (which Mill
adds in a footnote), 38 there is an aspect of universal utilitarianism that recognizes
the worth of persons, if only because persons are repositories of happiness.
If I am right there is more than one reason that can be given for the moral
repudiation of war. At one level we can argue that if we engage in warfare we
violate justice, for war violates the basic right of persons to be treated as persons.
At another level, it can be argued that both utilitarianism and deontological ethics
should repudiate war on their own grounds. Thus merely acting in accord with
justice, or following consistently either utilitarianism or deontological ethics,
arguably requires us to repudiate war. However what underlies and gives persons
the basic right to be treated as persons is their worth as persons, and, it seems
to me, religious ethics with its absolute requirement that we respond to others
with love, sees most clearly the deep place that the worth of persons as persons
has in ethics. 39 And hence religious ethics sees best the underlying moral basis
for pacifism. 40
California State University, Northridge
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